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ABSTRACT :
The theory of labor contract with worker’s chosen effort level mainly rests upon the principal-agent
paradigm. In many labor markets however, the principal is not as free as assumed in the standard
theory, but is submitted to some binding institutional constraints. It is requested in particular to post a
wage level, i.e. a non random component of compensation to which high rates of social contribution
may apply. The proposed model adapts the standard analysis to situations in which tax rules and
possibly predetermined profit-sharing patterns interfere with free contracting.
It formalizes the two-faced aspect of profit sharing having an impact on the firm’s objective through






La théorie du contrat de travail dans la situation où l’effort de l’employé est inobservable, repose pour
l’essentiel sur le modèle «principal-agent». Ce texte propose une analyse des contrats optimaux
lorsque l’employeur est soumis à des contraintes institutionnelles en particulier fiscales et étudie
l’impact des taux de contribution sociale sur les choix de l’employeur, cet impact ayant un double





JEL classification : J31, J33, K34Abstract
The theory of labor contract with worker’s chosen e¤ort level mainly rests upon
the principal-agent paradigm. In many labor markets however, the principal
is not as free as assumed in the standard theory, but is submitted to some
binding institutional constraints. It is requested in particular to post a wage
level, i.e. a non random component of compensation to which high rates of social
contribution may apply. The proposed model adapts the standard analysis to
situations in which tax rules and possibly predetermined pro…t-sharing patterns
interfere with free contracting.
It formalizes the two-faced aspect of pro…t sharing having an impact on the
…rm’s objective through tax saving e¤ect and incentive e¤ect.
Keywords: pro…t-sharing, incentives, tax evasion
JEL classi…cation: J31, J33, K341 Introduction
General properties of optimal e¤ort stimulating contracts have been widely in-
vestigated, especially in application of the well known principal-agent theory,
rooted in the seminal articles by Hart (1983) and Hart and Holmström (1987).
The available literature expounding this development of incentive theory is too
rich to be systematically quoted here, but a host of relevant references may be
found in a review by Prendergast (1999).
The principal-agent model can be applied to the analysis of labor contracts
when ouput can be individually ascribed to the workers. When this condition is
full…lled, it seems able to successfully predict the commonly observed solutions,
including special cases in which the worker is made residual claimant of ouput
as seen in Lazear (1995) and in the ”sharecropping” tradition.
As has been emphasized by Holmström (1979), the e¢ciency of contracts
in the principal-agent paradigm may be increased by introducing into the com-
pensation formula not only output, but any other variable, if it is statistically
related to the e¤ort level with limited noise. According to the ”informativeness
principle”, very complex and varied paying schemes should therefore appear.
In many instances however, only simple paying patterns are observed and the
sophisticated forms appear only if their bene…ts outweigh their costs, if their
properties are clearly understood in spite of bounded rationality of the parties
and if they are tolerated by the institutional environment.
In this paper labor contract design is analyzed, placing emphasis on the
role of institutional constraints interfering with private decisions. It must be
aknowledged indeed, that factors such as accounting costs, the legal framework,
including tax rules and sometimes mandatory pro…t-sharing rules, account for
situations in which the principal is not free to use all the instruments assumed
‡exible in the most abstract forms of the theory. In particular, in commonly
observed legal environments, taxes or social contributions are claimed from the
…rm and levied on the basis of a …xed component of the worker’s compensation
de…ned as ”wage”. In such a case, introducing or increasing the pro…t-sharing
component of the worker’s compensation and correspondingly diminishing the
weight of her wage enables the …rm to save on payroll taxes. On the …rst
hand, pro…t being a random variable, this cannot be done without introducing
randomness in the worker’s situation and therefore bearing the cost of compen-
sating this risk, in keeping with the relevant participation constraint; on the
other hand, an increased random component of compensation related to output
may also stimulate e¤ort. Tax saving e¤ects and e¤ort stimulating e¤ects are
therefore intimately mixed consequences of the contract.
In order to bring out the properties of contracts devised in such circum-
stances, a model is proposed along the following lines, adapted to weakly union-
ized environments in which collective bargaining could be neglected:
In astationary setting, the …rm chooses only a wage level and apro…t-sharing
rate, taking into account a participation constraint which aknowledges the role
of competition in the labor market. This behavior is sometimes itself optimal
rather than imposed by the environment. Conditions for the optimality of such
1linear rules have been scrutinized by Milgrom and Holmström (1987). But as
mentioned by Dixit (2002), these simple patterns are often observed even when
such rigorous conditions are not met, for their simplicity and relative robustness
against manipulation. In opposition to the e¢ciency wage literature, when it
deals with payroll taxes (Kevin Lang 2003), e¤ort cannot be monitored, and
our model is compatible with market clearing situations.
Contracts are proposed by a risk-neutral employer submitted to a predeter-
mined level of the participation constraint. No standard incentive constraint
is introduced, but a continuous ”e¤ort supply” function is derived from the
worker’s preferences and from its ability to in‡uence productivity. Labor being
assumed homogenous, the model does not shed direct light on the interesting
aspects of workers self selection. It aims at explaining the …rm’s choice among
possible contract patterns in relation with the level of wage based taxes, and
with the induced e¤ort levels. It turns out that multiple solutions cannot be
ruled out in such a context. The model can …nally be used to sketch the analysis
of possible legal pro…t-sharing rules such as those existing for instance in the
French legal setting.
It must …nally be mentioned that pro…t-sharing contracts have been ana-
lyzed in an original way by Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1991), who showed that,
within an oligopolistic context in the output market, traditional Cournot-Nash
equilibrium implicitly based on straight-wage labor compensation is not robust
if pro…t-sharing is allowed. They show that in such a case, each …rm individually
has an incentive to diminish wages and share pro…ts with workers, increasing its
market share and its residual pro…t. The generalized pro…t-sharing Nash equi-
librium in this case is more favorable to the consumer thanks to an increased
industry supply, but pro…ts are reduced. A step towards cooperation between
…rms of the same trade would consist in ruling out pro…t-sharing and the law
would be required to preclude this form of collusion. This striking result, as
well as the results obtained by Bughin (1999) is however, obtained in a special
output market structure, without consideration of the role of wage-based taxes
in explaining the structure of labor contracts.
The analysis developed in this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 is devoted to the agent’s choice. It speci…es her e¤ort supply
problem, and explains the responsiveness of the endogenous e¤ort level to the
parameters chosen by the …rm.
Section 3 explains the principal’s choice between di¤erent forms of contract,
such as straight wage, private pro…t-sharing or pure partnership.
Section 4 illustrates the model with an example and simulates it numeri-
cally. Also, as an application of the model, possible perverse e¤ects of binding
mandatory pro…t-sharing rules are exposed.
22 E¤ort supply and institutional constraints
2.1 Axioms and notations
We suppose that S states of the world (1;2;:::s:::S) can take place with prob-
abilities (p1;:::ps:::pS): In state s; observable net output from a worker is Xs:
From the choice of indices, the sequence fXsg
S
s=1 is increasing.
Axiom 1: The probability distribution of output is in‡uenced by the worker’s









We de…ne a cumulative function
F (z) = Pr
n





ps(h); for z = (1;2;:::;s;::;S)


























s(h) > 0 : expected output is increasing in h:
Axiom 3: we assume decreasing marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the cumulative
function in the following sense:
8z < S;
d2F (z)





















s(h) < 0 : e¤ort has decreasing returns in terms of expected
output.





ps(h)U(Cs) ¡ h (1)
where the function U( ) is concave, and where Cs is the worker’s compensa-
tion in state s:
Axiom 5: The …rm is risk neutral and maximizes the expected value of its
residual pro…t.
32.2 Institutional constraints and notations
Contracts patterns are constrained by institutional rules and the …rm cannot
freely determine Cs in each state of the world. The …rm has to declare a …xed
non negative wage, and must pay taxes (or social contributions) at a …xed
rate ¿ on wage. The resulting pro…t is shared with the worker according to a
conventional (but state independent) proportion µ ¸ 0.
In state s, the accounted pro…t is therefore
¦s = Xs ¡ w(1 + ¿) (2)
- the worker’s compensation is
Cs = w + µ¦s = µXs + w [1¡ µ(1 + ¿)] (3)
- residual pro…t is de…ned in each state by
Rs = (1¡ µ)¦s (4)




s=1 are always increasing and that
for µ > 0; fCsg
S
s=1 is increasing and fU0(Cs)g
S
s=1 is decreasing
Obviously, any contract (w;µ) determines consumption Cs in each state,
but for S > 2; this set of rules does not enable the …rm to span the whole
consumption space.
We assume that the …rm is pro…table in the stationary state and therefore:
¦e = E (¦) > 0
2.3 Incentive e¤ects: e¤ort supply, interior and corner
solutions
2.3.1 Interior solutions: su¢cient …rst order conditions
For any contract (w;µ), the worker determines e¤ort level h, in order to maxi-
mize V (h):
If the induced e¤ort level h¤ is positive, the following …rst and second order










s(h¤) < 0: (6)
Since the sequence fU(Cs)g
S
s=1 is increasing, the lemma in Appendix I with





s(h) < 0 8h > 0. The function V (h) is concave in h and therefore
…rst order condition(5) is su¢cient for a global maximum.
An indirect utility function V ¤(w;µ) is then de…ned by
V ¤(w;µ) = V (h¤) =
S P
s=1
ps(h¤)U(Cs) ¡ h¤ (7)
It must be noticed that this explanation of the e¤ort supply is strictly indi-
vidualistic; it neglects the possible ”peer pressure” e¤ect as reported for instance
by Kandel and Lazear (1992)
Responsiveness of optimal e¤ort to wages. For an interior solution, the
responsiveness of the optimal e¤ort to the wage rate and to the pro…t share is
obtained in derivating (5) with respect to w and µ:
h¤










For µ > 0; the sequence fU0(Cs)g
S
s=1 is decreasing and the lemma applied to
fQsg
S
















s(h¤) < 0; we have
h¤




Unambiguously, an increase in the …xed wage component of compensation
reduces the induced e¤ort level.
Notice that this negative incentive e¤ect is related the concavity of the utility





s(h¤) = 0; from (8) h¤
w = 0 . This situation is analyzed in appendix
II.
Responsiveness of optimal e¤ort to the pro…t-sharing rate The re-













5Since the denominator in (9) is negative, an increased participation rate












s(h¤) > 0; a su¢cient condition
for h¤
µ > 0.
This would be trivially veri…ed when U0(C) = Cst (in the absence of risk
aversion). We show that some bounded level of relative risk aversion may guar-
antee this property.
Since each term may be written Qs = ¦sU 0(w+µ¦s) and since the sequence
f¦sg
S
s=1 is increasing, fQsg
S
s=1 is itself increasing if
dQs
d¦s
> 0; or equivalently,
if U0(Cs) + µ¦sU00(Cs) > 0
For ¦s < 0, this inequality always holds for risk averse workers; if ¦s > 0;
















The condition is in particular always ful…lled for U(C) = ln(C) involving
¾ = 1:
2.3.2 Corner solutions and the perfunctory behavior domain
If V 0(0) < 0; perfunctory behavior is a solution. For instance, when µ = 0;









s(0) ¡ 1 = ¡1: (11)
No e¤ort is supplied. It is worth noticing that perfunctory behavior h¤ = 0
is a solution not only for µ = 0 (no incentive), but also for 0 < µ < "; with




s(h) is a continuous function of µ; V 0(0) is
strictly negative in a neighborhood of µ = 0; for some " > 0; we have V 0(0) < 0;
8µ < "; implying h¤ = 0:
A positive pro…t-sharing rate is not su¢cient to induce a positive e¤ort level.
The existence of this perfunctory behavior domain is not an idiosyncratic
property of the semi-linear form adopted for V (h): if we replace it with the




ps(h)U(Cs)¡g(h) with g(0) = 0; g0(h) > 0; g00(h) > 0 8h > 0; it
is easily shown in the same way that h = 0 is a corner solution in a neighborhood
of µ = 0:
3 The optimal contract
3.1 General setting
Since the contract has incentive properties, the employer takes into account the
e¤ort supply function in determining the optimal compensation rule. The …rm’s
problem consists in maximizing expected residual pro…t for an endogenous prob-
ability distribution of states of the world, under a participation constraint due
to competition in the labor market and involving the indirect utility function.
This problem is represented by:
8
> > > <




subject to : V ¤(w;µ) ¸ V
¯ w ¸ 0
0 · µ · 1
(12)
Where Re = (1¡ µ)
S P
s=1
ps(h¤)[Xs ¡ w(1+ ¿)]; or
R
e = (1 ¡ µ)[X
e(h










is the satisfaction level re‡ecting the participation constraint. The
analytical conditions of the problem are complicated since no simple concavity
argument can be applied to second order conditions or to uniqueness. The
constraint w ¸ 0 is relaxed in appendix II.
We …rst examine some properties of the involved functions.
3.1.1 Responsiveness of residual pro…t to wages
From (13) Re
w = (1¡ µ) [Xe
hh¤





h > 0 and h¤
w < 0
Re
w = (1¡ µ) [Xe
w ¡ (1 + ¿)] < 0 (15)
Residual pro…t is always decreasing in wages.
73.1.2 Responsiveness of residual pro…t to the pro…t-sharing rate:
sharing e¤ect and incentive e¤ect
From (13) Re






e + (1¡ µ)X
e
µ (16)
The e¤ect of increasing µ on the objective function can be broken into two
components:
- a pure sharing e¤ect (¡¦e) always negative,
- an incentive e¤ect (1¡ µ)Xe
µ = (1¡ µ)Xe
hh¤
µ induced by the responsiveness
of e¤ort to the pro…t-sharing rate, whose sign is determined by the sign of h¤
µ:
The sign of the responsiveness Re
µ is therefore related to the signs and mag-
nitudes of the two components
3.1.3 Responsiveness of the indirect utility function
Applying the enveloppe theorem, it may be shown from (5) and (7) that :
V ¤
w = [1¡ µ(1 + ¿)]E
n






~ ¦U 0( ~ C
o
(18)
The sign of V ¤
µ is not always positive. A su¢cient condition for V ¤




, since in this case ¦s ¸ 0 8s
3.2 Types of solutions
Solutions can belong to three types :
- straight wage contracts: (w¤;0)
- interior solutions: (w¤;µ¤)
- pure partnership contracts: (0;µ
¤)




; in each state of the world, compensation
and residual pro…t are both decreasing in w; implying a pure pro…t-sharing
contract.
In spite of the increased complexity induced by endogenous probability of
the states of the world, it is possible to sketch an analytical and a graphical
approach.
The Lagrangian associated to a solution of (12) is in general:
$ = Re + ¸[V ¤(µ;w) ¡ V
¯
]: (19)











µ · 0; µ$µ = 0 (21)
3.2.1 Straight wage impossibility
We show …rst that the existence of wage based taxes (¿ > 0) rules out straight
wage as a solution.We have seen that the e¤ort level is constant h¤ = 0 for µ < "
In a neighborhood of (w;0); the lagrangian takes a special form where e¤ort is
nil and the probability distribution of states is unaltered by su¢ciently small
variations of the parameters de…ning the contract:
$ = (1 ¡ µ)
S P
s=1








In the straight wage case, obviously, from the participation constraint, if
µ
¤ = 0; w¤ > 0.
A straight wage solution (µ = 0) would require: $w = Re
w + ¸V ¤
w = 0 and
$µ = Re
µ + ¸V ¤
µ · 0
First order necessary conditions related to (22) are therefore for µ = 0:




0(Cs) = 0 (23)
or for µ = 0 :






0(Cs) · 0 (25)
or for µ = 0 :
¡¦e + ¸U 0(w)¦e · 0 (26)






, contradictory conditions for ¿ > 0
It is worth noticing that this result may be obtained in any situation with no
incentive e¤ects, when the probability distribution of the di¤erent states does
not depend on e¤ort.
93.2.2 Partnership and interior solutions: global and local analysis
A global view and and a full understanding of (12) would require a complete
representation in space(w;µ) of three types of curves;
- indi¤erence curves of thee¤ort supplying workers V ¤(w;µ) = C st, including
the participation constraint V ¤(w;µ) =V
¯ - curves of constant e¤ort level h¤(w;µ) = Cst
- curves of constant expected residual pro…ts of the …rm, Re(w;µ) = Cst
We calculate the slopes of the three curves, but leave their convexity prop-
erties undetermined.












= ¡[1 ¡ µ(1+ ¿)]
E
n




~ ¦U 0( ~ C)
o: (27)
The horizontal line µ =
1
1 + ¿
is itself a constant indirect utility curve.



























The horizontal line µ =
1
1 + ¿
is itself also a constant e¤ort curve.
Constant expected residual pro…t curves, the role of incentive e¤ects
From (13) :
Re
w = (1¡ µ) [Xe





















The …rst term in the right-hand side of (29) is related tothe incentive e¤ect of
wages on expected output and the second term is a pure wage e¤ect on residual
pro…t. Since h¤




s(h¤) > 0; Re
w < 0:
10The …rst term in the right-hand side of (30) is a pure pro…t sharing e¤ect
related to an increase in µ and the second term captures the incentive e¤ect on
residual pro…t of increasing the worker’s share.













w ¡ (1+ ¿)]
(1 ¡ µ)Xe






µ may happen to be negative when the
incentive e¤ect (1 ¡ µ)Xe
µ is positive and of su¢cient magnitude.
Pure partnership Pure partnership is a corner solution of (12) implying
w = 0 It would require as …rst order conditions: $w = Re
w + ¸V ¤
w · 0 and
$µ = Re
µ + ¸V ¤
µ = 0




is always a pure part-
nership since in this case, both Rs and Cs are decreasing functions of w in each
state: The worker and the …rm collude to bring the wage rate to zero, at the
expense of collected taxes.




















w ¡ (1 + ¿)]
(1 ¡ µ)Xe







~ ¦U 0( ~ C)
o (32)
It is intuitively expected that pure partnership should prevail when incentive
e¤ects are substantial and contribution rates are high. Moreover, we can show
that in the limit case where incentive e¤ects are neglected, partnership cannot
be solution for small values of the contribution rate.
In the limit case where p0
s(h) = 0 8s; perfunctory behaviour always prevails
and Xe
w = X e
µ = 0;
The special form of (32) is:
(1¡ µ)(1 + ¿)







~ ¦U0( ~ C)
o (33)









o so that (33) can be written:
111¡ µ(1 + ¿)
(1¡ µ)(1+ ¿)
· ° (34)
We assume ° > 0 and we prove that ° < 1
From its de…nition, ° > 0 i¤ E
n
~ XU 0(µ ~ X)
o
> 0; a su¢cient condition for
this is Xs > 0 8s
To check that ° < 1; since U(C) is neoclassical, and µ > 0, we write:
COV
n




















Straightforward calculations show that inequality (34) is equivalent to:
1 + ¿ ¸
1
µ + °(1 ¡ µ)
. Since µ 2 ]0;1[the convex combination µ + °(1¡ µ) 2
]0;1[; and we can de…ne
^ ¿ =
1
µ + °(1¡ µ)
¡ 1 > 0:
The condition for pure partnership is therefore ¿ > ^ ¿:
Interior solutions Since solution of (12) always exist (from Weierstrass the-
orem) and since straight wage cannot be a solution for ¿ > 0, interior solutions
prevail when 0 < ¿ < ^ ¿.
By a continuity argument, this analysis still prevails if jp0
s(h)j · " 8s, when
the impact of e¤ort is su¢ciently small.
The uniqueness of interior solution is not established, for want of simple
convexity (concavity) arguments concerning the feasible set and the objective
function.
4 A two states case and its simulation
4.1 The model
As a possible illustration, we analyze the optimum private contract and the
in‡uence of the legal pro…t sharing rule, considering a two states case s = (1;2)
in which e¤ort a¤ects the probability distribution of outcomes according to:
p1 = e¡®h and p2 = 1 ¡ e¡®h (35)
Such a setting embodies in a simple form …rst order stochastic-dominance; e¤ort
has positive but decreasing returns in terms of expected output since Xe
h =
®e¡®h(X2 ¡ X1) > 0 and Xe
hh = ¡®2e¡®h(X2 ¡ X1) < 0:
The (positive) parameter ® is related to the individual power of a worker
to alter the probability distribution of her/his contribution to output. In the
12absence of e¤ort, h = 0; and the output takes on its low value with certainty.
Certainty for state 2 would demand an in…nite e¤ort level.
The satisfaction level of a worker depends upon the e¤ort level:





U(C2) ¡ h (36)
For interior solutions V 0(h¤) = 0; or:
e¡®h¤
[U(C2) ¡ U(C1)] = 1=® (37)
It must be noted that perfunctory behavior or zero e¤ort is solution whenever
U(C2) ¡ U(C1) · 1=® (38)
The condition C2 > C1 is therefore not su¢cient to induce positive e¤ort, and as
intuitively expected, e¤ort stimulation tends to become impossible when ® ! 0:




¡1Ln [U(C2) ¡ U(C1)]: (39)









2 = 1 ¡ p
¤
1: (40)




¦2U 0(C2) ¡ ¦1U 0(C1)
® [U(C2) ¡ U(C1)]
(41)
-We assume bounded risk aversion so that: h¤
µ > 0; as shown in 2.3.1
The curves h¤ of constant e¤ort are represented on schedule 1.
Space (w;µ); is divided in two regions by the continuous and ascending line

























From (27), the thick curve VV; representing constant values of the indirect
utility function satisfying the participation constraint is represented with a neg-
ative slope. This is the case when E
n
~ ¦U 0( ~ C)
o
> 0. We have seen in 3.1.3 that




The curve RR representing constant levels of expected residual output is
represented with a positive slope for small values of µ:
In fact, Re
µ = ¡¦e + (1 ¡ µ)Xe
µ may be positive if the sharing e¤ect on ex-
pected residual pro…t is smaller than the incentive e¤ect. The slope of RR
is in…nite when the two e¤ects are exactly o¤setting (1 ¡ µ)Xe
µ = ¦e: For






Point E represents the private optimum as an interior solution. It implies
private wage rate wE, private pro…t-sharing rate µE and equilibrium e¤ort level
h¤
E:
4.2 Consequences of a binding legal pro…t-sharing rate
Point L represents the contract chosen by the …rm under the binding legalpro…t-
sharing rate µ ¸ µL, implying the reduced wage wL the increased e¤ort level h¤
L
and reduced expected residual pro…t.
Productivity enhancing e¤ects of mandatory pro…t-sharing are a debated
issue as illustrated by Weitzman and Kruse (1990), Kruse (1992), Jones and
14Kato (1995) Prendergast (1999), Fakhfakh and Perotin (2000)
It is important to notice that the legal constraint in our exposed model
actually increases expected output as measured by national accounts. But in
this case, the obtained growth does not signal increased welfare for any social
group, since it is compensated by more intense e¤ort by the workers and is
accompanied by reduced expected pro…ts for the …rms.
Legalpro…t-sharing rules donot impose toshare the pro…t attributable tothe
individual employee, but a company average pro…t. In this case, the incentive
e¤ects tend to fade in large organizations and the model falls back to the special
case where there is no incentive. The e¤ort supply function becomes a simple
participation constraint.
4.3 Simulation
Since the shape of the curves we have used is partially tentative, a simple simu-
lation has been performed and is illustrated by schedule 2, a computed version
of schedule 1.
The visible interior solution has been obtained using Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion utility functions U(C) = ¡e¡°C; for the following value of the
parameters:




Simulations con…rm that ”high” risk aversion levels are necessary to obtain
interior solution for the chosen level of the contribution rate (¿ = 0:5)
Otherwise, corner solutions (pure partnerships) prevail, a consequence of the
high value of the social contribution rate.
15tor is endowed with market power and is really making pro…t, the rest of the
economy being characterized by pro…t-squeezing open product competition, the
…rms of the …rst subset face a stable participation constraint which is explained
by the satisfaction obtained by the worker in the competitive sector. Bind-
ing legal pro…t-sharing rates tend to induce sub-optimal substitution of wages
with pro…t shares taking place in the pro…table subset, diminishing the ex-
pected residual pro…t of …rms and pro…t-based taxes, and diminishing wage
rates and wage-based collected social contributions. Government and welfare
agencies have therefore either to reduce the ‡ow of their services or to increase
the contribution rates they apply to the whole economy, inducing a perverse
redistributive e¤ect, the tax burden shifting from the more pro…table sector to
the whole economy. A noticable substitution of wages with pro…t shares under




If the sequence fQsg
S






Ps = 0 and
z P
s=1

















= PS > 0








If S = 2; this inequality may be rewritten P2Q2 + P1Q1 > 0 and the proof
is completed.








































17Conversely, if the sequence fQsg
S
s=1 is decreasing, the same assumptions







It is possible to check wether our model con…rms the solution in which the agent
is made residual claimant of output when her/his risk aversion is nil.
In order to exhibit this special case, we have to relax our institutional con-
straint w ¸ 0 and admit ¿ = 0 since there are no negative taxes contributing
to residual pro…t when wages are negative. First order conditions related to the




















~ ¦U0( ~ C)
o =
(1¡ µ) [Xe
w ¡ (1 + ¿)]
(1 ¡ µ)Xe
µ ¡ ¦e (43)
From (8), in the case of no risk aversion, the e¤ort level is not in‡uenced
by the wage rate, since U 0(Cs) = Cst 8s and therefore since h¤





The condition (43) takes on the simpli…ed form, for X e




¦e ¡ (1 ¡ µ)Xe
µ
(44)
This equality implies either Xe
µ = 0 or µ = 1
We have shown that in the case of no risk aversion, the responsiveness of
e¤ort to the pro…t-sharing rate h¤





µ = 0 is ruled out, and we conclude that µ = 1:
It is worth noticing that with the adopted continuous e¤ort supply function,
the risk neutral worker should therefore be made residual claimant as in Lazear
(1999).
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